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German Private Pension Law 
Current State and Future Directions
Markus Roth
 University of Marburg
PRIVATE PENSIONS AT THE CROSSROADS OF SECURITY 
AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Shifting demographics and increased globalization are challeng-
ing the pension systems of industrialized nations worldwide. Given the 
structural problems of Germany’s social insurance and state-funded 
social security programs, the privately funded pension sector needs to 
be strengthened (Börsch-Supan 2004).1 A comprehensive analysis and 
doctrinal foundation for private pensions must be developed with due 
regard of the opportunities and risks associated with private pensions, 
both of which result from the asset funding of private pensions. Despite 
the general economic downturn during the recent fi nancial crisis, the 
expected rate of return of private pensions constitutes a major opportu-
nity. Key risks lie in the failure to achieve expected rates of return and 
in the possibility of capital loss. In developing a legal framework of a 
system of private pensions and its individual products, appropriate con-
sideration needs to be given to such opportunities and risks.
Whereas the German social security plan, the cornerstone of the 
German public pension system, generates an expected nominal return 
on employee and employer contributions of 0 to 2 percent,2 a return of 
4 to 8 percent is possible for private pensions. In the past, these lev-
els of real returns have been achieved on capital markets, at least over 
signifi cant time periods. This is particularly true of long-term invest-
ment in equity securities.3 The risks associated with private pensions 
must be understood against the background of a long contractual pe-
riod.4 The fi nancial security of citizens does not depend on a low rate 
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of return volatility alone; other factors may well have to be considered 
in assessing the suitability of an investment vehicle for retirement. The 
guarantees granted by private pension providers ought to be reviewed 
according to their long-term feasibility and economic profi tability.
The opportunities and risks associated with the investment in capital 
raise the question of the underlying model of modern private pensions. 
While traditional legal thinking in Germany focuses on nominal secu-
rity, the modern view, as well as international thinking, attaches greater 
importance to personal responsibility. Looking at the concepts of secu-
rity and personal responsibility, it is necessary to balance the tension 
between them in private pensions. First steps were undertaken by the 
65th German Jurists Forum of 2004, which addressed issues of fi nancial 
security and personal responsibility in both occupational and individual 
pensions (Steinmeyer 2004). The international prevailing model of the 
responsible and informed citizen focuses on the possibilities rather than 
the risks of private pensions. The model further underpins the freedom 
of choice through disclosure duties.
UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE PENSION LAW
Links between Branches of Private Pension Law
Analyzing the system of private pensions in an integrated fashion 
departs from the traditional approach, which separates the treatment of 
investment products of individual pensions, such as life insurance and 
investment funds. The systems of occupational and individual pensions 
have also been analyzed separately. However, the products of indi-
vidual and occupational retirement provision are frequently interlinked 
and functionally interchangeable. For individual citizens, it makes no 
difference whether they receive an occupational pension or payments 
from an individual pension in addition to their social security pension. 
Furthermore, the law of occupational pensions utilizes investment ve-
hicles of individual pensions. According to the German Occupational 
Pensions Act, this is the case for occupational pension plans managed 
through external institutions, provided the external institution is a life 
insurance company; retirement funds and pension funds are also used, 
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albeit to a lesser extent. If the use of defi ned contribution plans (in 
which employers make no pension payment guarantees) were accepted 
by the German Occupational Pensions Act, then all investment vehicles 
of individual pensions would also be possible in occupational pensions. 
A comprehensive analysis of German laws on occupational and 
individual pensions facilitates the identifi cation of similarities in le-
gal instruments of private pensions and sets a basis for developing 
principles protecting participants spanning all legal forms of private 
pensions. At the same time, these protective principles could serve to 
further develop the existing law on private pensions. This is of par-
ticular relevance for disclosure requirements and, more generally, for 
occupational pension law. Only when provided with adequate informa-
tion is the benefi ciary able to make an informed decision on a preferred 
pension product. Because private pension products are interchangeable, 
the required information needs to be delivered in a consistent format.
To develop occupational pension law in Germany, key issues are 
the creation of a separate pool of assets for funding occupational re-
tirement plans and the introduction of defi ned contribution plans.5 The 
Occupational Pensions Act does not require external funding of defi ned 
benefi t plans. Many German employers fund pension obligations inter-
nally, by means of a book reserve recorded on the company’s balance 
sheet (book reserve funding). Corresponding with the international 
standard of external funding and encouraged by international account-
ing standards (IAS 19), large listed stock corporations in Germany 
already deviate from this practice and cover (direct) pension obligations 
with internal or external trusts. The Accounting Law Modernization Act 
(Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz)6 recently reformed German ac-
counting law, and companies subject to the accounting standards of the 
Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) are expected to follow interna-
tional practice in the future.
Again departing from international standards, German occupational 
pension law does not provide for true defi ned contribution plans; instead, 
it requires the employer to serve as a guarantor of payments during the 
disbursement period. According to the Federal Labor Court (Bundes-
arbeitsgericht), general labor law applies in this regard. In concrete 
terms, this means that the system of protective principles applicable to 
occupational pension law, rather than the Occupational Pensions Act, 
serves as the legal basis for defi ned contribution pensions. True defi ned 
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contribution pensions could be transferred into the scope of the Oc-
cupational Pensions Act by making the protective principles prescribed 
by the Act applicable to them. A further point of concern is that the Oc-
cupational Pensions Act does not give employees the choice between 
various pension products. In the interest of affording employees more 
personal responsibility, this should be rectifi ed in the future.
Interdisciplinary Approach
The importance of private pensions in general, and the position of 
the capitalization (advance funding) principle as an autonomous fi eld 
of law in particular call for an interdisciplinary and comparative analy-
sis. The fact that asset funding of private pensions necessarily involves 
capital markets7 highlights the need for an interdisciplinary treatment 
of the topic. To understand capital markets properly, and to evaluate 
the investment decisions, requires consideration of both legal and eco-
nomic academic literature.
An analysis of private pensions is not possible without using 
economic concepts and theories, including questions relating to the 
economic advantages of funding private pensions,8 as well as debating 
whether to favor the effi cient fi nancial market hypothesis or behavioral 
fi nance theory. Taking account also of the fi nancial crisis and its effects, 
economic theories might serve as a guiding principle for appropriately 
developing private pension law, provided the theories are substantiated 
by empirical data. The contribution of private pensions to intergenera-
tional justice is of general signifi cance. Every generation is responsible 
to provide for its retirement (Leinert and Esche 2000). This highlights 
the need for a funded pension plan for the baby boom generation’s old 
age. Failing to develop funded pensions would unfairly burden the next 
generation in providing for a much larger older generation through tra-
ditional pension systems (Börsch-Supan 2004).
The societal importance of private pensions also requires con-
sideration of social sciences. Of signifi cance are demographics (thus 
far showing a constant trend toward rising life expectancy), actuarial 
sciences, and behavioral sciences. Retirement provision is a topic fre-
quently ignored by society in general. Private retirement provision has 
thus far been practiced mainly by those who have higher incomes and 
are better educated, but those who have lower incomes or education 
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levels are particularly in need of private pensions. Because it can be 
diffi cult to interest the latter social classes in private pension plans, set-
ting incentives for intermediaries and especially employers ought to be 
considered.9
CONTRACTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
Defi ned Benefi t, Defi ned Contribution, and Hybrid Pensions
German law on private pensions is in need of systematization. This 
can be done typologically according to the service content of a particu-
lar individual pension contract. Based on internationally acknowledged 
labor law terminology, private pension contracts can be divided into 
three categories: defi ned benefi t pensions, defi ned contribution pen-
sions, and hybrid pensions.
For individual pensions, fully guaranteed (defi ned benefi t) retire-
ment income in the form of an annuity is rarely provided; whereas for 
occupational pensions, defi ned benefi t pensions in the form of so-called 
direct obligations funded internally by a book reserve on an employer’s 
balance sheet are still common German practice. Trust administration, 
management by power of attorney, investment funds, and defi ned con-
tribution pensions depend entirely on the asset management’s outcome. 
Hybrid pensions are of particular importance. Insurance-based pension 
contracts, which have traditionally dominated individual pensions in 
Germany, belong to this group. Retirement funds (Pensionskassen), 
life insurance contracts in occupational pensions, pension funds, and 
investment funds with warranty certifi cates typically are also hybrid 
pensions.
As previously stated, defi ned contribution pensions do not fall under 
the Occupational Pensions Act; rather, their regulation is derived from 
general principles of German labor law, subject to further development 
by the courts and academia.10 The development of employee protection 
for defi ned contribution pensions should, however, be modeled after the 
Occupational Pensions Act. Such an approach would imply a restriction 
on forfeiture, increased portability, and the allocation of the profi ts from 
asset management. Because they bear the risk of investment, employees 
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are no less in need of the legal protection granted to people with classi-
cal benefi ts under the Occupational Pensions Act. As in other countries, 
defi ned contribution pensions in Germany ought to be conceptually un-
derstood as occupational pensions.
Institutions in Private Pensions
The term “private pension” is a generalized term encompassing the 
provision of individual and occupational retirement provision. Individ-
ual pensions are frequently managed through insurance companies and 
sometimes through investment funds and annuities. The term “occupa-
tional retirement provision” covers defi ned contribution pensions and 
conceptually also occupational pensions falling under the Occupational 
Pensions Act. The Occupational Pensions Act focuses on guarantees of 
the employer and therefore on the disbursement period. Until 2001, it 
was called the Act for Improved Retirement Provision. Internationally, 
the focus is more on the period of accumulation, in which the invest-
ment decisions are made. In this period, an institution is chosen through 
which the private pension plan is to be managed.
The choice of a pension product is determined by German tax law, 
which is relatively restrictive in international comparison. Particularly 
for individual retirement plans, the scope of fi scal promotion is limited 
when compared to the state-funded social security pension. In addition, 
the guarantee offered for the deposited contributions restricts the bene-
fi ciary’s freedom of choice. The tax law’s reference to the Occupational 
Pensions Act effectively makes the occupational retirement provision 
less fl exible because only occupational pension plans as defi ned by 
the Occupational Pensions Act are promoted. The Act also does not 
grant the employee freedom of choice and requires a guarantee by the 
employer.
Employees’ restricted freedom of choice follows from the syn-
chronization of control and liability in the Occupational Pensions Act. 
Mandatory defi ned benefi t pensions lead employers to select a risk 
structure. Employers’ choice for the risk structure neglects the individ-
ual interests of employees especially in defi ned contribution plans in 
which the employees bear the investment risks. Following the practice 
in the United States, greater freedom of choice should be granted to 
employees. An insurance-based pension could also be offered.
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When comparing the risk structures of various types of private pen-
sions, the specifi c risks of defi ned benefi t pensions need to be taken 
into account. This is especially true of the risk of insolvency, which is 
partially borne by the employee, and the lack of infl ation adjustment 
of pension promises for workers leaving employment prior to being 
eligible to receive a pension. Overall, the generalized statement that 
defi ned benefi t pensions are more benefi cial for employees than defi ned 
contribution pensions must be rejected. Each plan carries risks and ben-
efi ts that must be examined in light of potentially unstable and changing 
political and economic environments, subject to shifting demographics 
and climate change.
PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PENSIONS
Principles of protection for private pensions include the pension 
protection triangle and the loyally administered separate fund. To focus 
on one to the exclusion of the other neglects the particular nature of 
private pensions and the tension between security and responsibility.
Termination (exit), consultation (voice), and guarantees taken 
together form the pension protection triangle. The triangle relaxes 
the traditional German focus on guarantees in private pensions. The 
inclusion of exit (i.e., the termination of contract) and voice (i.e., con-
sultation) applies the general concepts of protection in private law to 
pension contracts. Extending protection from nominal guarantees takes 
into account the tension between security and responsibility; while 
guarantees are associated with security, exit and voice are legal rules 
providing for self-responsibility. Not all components of the protection 
triangle need to be contained in each pension contract. Guarantees for 
defi ned benefi t pensions in particular and the possibility of termina-
tion for asset management are suffi cient. Alteration of the contract is 
a less severe measure than termination of insurance contracts and oc-
cupational pensions.
To the extent that occupational pensions are subject to supervi-
sion by a general fi nancial market authority, this supervision could be 
transferred to a specifi c regulatory authority, as is done in the United 
Kingdom. This would take account not only of the distinctive features 
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of occupational pensions but also of the fact that insurance-based invest-
ments are not the only means of obtaining fi nancial security. Pursuant 
to the Pension Funds Directive, contractual trust agreements (CTAs) 
could also be placed under supervision, but this has not yet been done in 
Germany. Establishing a specifi c regulatory authority to oversee CTAs 
would be an appropriate measure. Germany’s insurance supervision is 
particularly rigid and should be developed on the basis of the British 
model. Such a development is expected in the coming years due to Eu-
ropean solvency requirements.
The model of the loyally administered separate fund is applicable 
to private pension plans managed through life insurance companies 
and investment funds. However, the model has thus far not featured 
prominently in Germany’s occupational pension laws, which have tra-
ditionally been premised on an occupational pension promise covered 
solely by a book reserve recorded on the sponsoring company’s bal-
ance sheet. Yet, according to the German Federal Court, book reserves 
covering direct obligations constitute a quasi-separate fund. In practice, 
the model of the loyally administered separate fund already applies to 
companies bound by internationally accepted accounting principles. 
The pension promises of about two-thirds of the 30 largest German 
companies listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange (the DAX 30) are al-
ready covered by separate assets, particularly through CTAs. CTAs and 
separate funds in general are important for insolvency protection. Due 
to the possibility of netting pension obligations and internal or external 
trusts pursuant to the Accounting Law Modernization Act, CTAs can 
newly be used by companies subject to the accounting standards of the 
Commercial Code.
In regard to occupational pensions, both the Pension Funds Direc-
tive in Europe and the ERISA pension law in the United States stipulate 
that separate funds be managed solely in the interests of the benefi -
ciaries. Private pension institutions are subject to fi duciary duties, and 
investments should also be managed in the sole interest of benefi ciaries. 
The principle of precautionary investments, which is the prudent person 
rule based on portfolio theory, should apply. The focus should be on 
the investment risk of the entire portfolio, not on particular classes of 
investment. The principles of diversifi cation and long-term investment 
should also be adhered to.
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The legal concept demanding a prompt allocation of surplus funds 
in life insurance policies, which the Federal Financial Supervisory 
Authority inherited from the previous federal Supervisory Offi ce for 
the Insurance Industry, is not compatible with long-term investment 
practice. By contrast, accumulation of unallocated reserves enables 
investments in both high-risk and long-term investment forms, promis-
ing higher returns. Investment in shares is particularly effective in this 
regard.
PENSION CONTRACTS
Establishment of Pension Contracts
Occupational pension contracts can be established individually or 
collectively and should contain the essential contractual elements. All 
pension contracts should also specify whether they provide for defi ned 
benefi t, defi ned contribution, or hybrid pensions.
In terms of the revised law on standard business terms, pension con-
tracts are now subject to the tests on standard form clauses prescribed by 
the German Civil Code. This is also true of insurance contracts, invest-
ment contracts, and since the reform of the law of obligation, pension 
promises under the Occupational Pensions Act. Even clauses reciting 
legislation trigger the tests of standard business terms, and transpar-
ency requirements are also applicable. Further attention should be paid 
to equal treatment requirements, upon which the validity of pension 
contracts in occupational pension plans can depend.
Pension contracts are often integrated into a web of various per-
sons’ contractual obligations. Contractual arrangements, particularly 
for occupational pension plans managed through an external institu-
tion, can be described as a nexus of contracts. This legal concept can be 
used especially for the allocation of contractual obligations. Thereby an 
overlap in duties of both an employer and an external private pension 
institution can be avoided. This enables disclosure duties to be assigned 
to the external occupational pension institution.
To date, private pension institutions’ duties to provide information 
at the stage of contract conclusion are still arranged heterogeneously. 
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Disclosure duties for private pension institutions even before contract 
establishment are based on fi duciary duties. At the same time, disclo-
sure duties should be understood as correlating to the participation of 
private pension products in the marketplace. This enables the disclosure 
duties to be harmonized. It is highly recommended to require insurance 
companies, in addition to investment funds and pension funds, to dis-
close the principles of their investment policy to benefi ciaries. Such a 
requirement exists in the United Kingdom. To make an informed deci-
sion on entering into an insurance contract, the insured party has to be 
made aware not only of the role of the investment income but also of the 
manner in which it was earned.
The Period of Pension Accrual
In the period of pension accrual, the benefi ciary is obliged to provide 
capital and remunerate the private pension institution pursuant to con-
tractual specifi cations. The remuneration must be explicitly disclosed in 
the pension contract, failing which, the usual remuneration is payable. 
If the pension contract lacks such disclosure, the remuneration is to be 
set by the courts at the lowest margin of the remuneration range used 
in the market. Forfeiture of pension plans is a special feature, and the 
respective provisions in the Occupational Pensions Act apply to defi ned 
contribution pensions. In Germany, employers have no obligation to 
fund occupational pension promises. Yet such an obligation can be im-
posed if distributions to shareholders would disproportionately increase 
the risk of insolvency, thereby protecting employees from bearing the 
associated risk that the adjustment of pensions would be cancelled in 
the disbursement period. This is especially the case in debt-fi nanced 
company takeovers.
Private pension institutions are frequently subject to investment re-
quirements. One such requirement is imposed by the Pension Funds 
Directive to develop and implement investment guidelines. Insurance 
companies are also subject to this requirement. Deriving from the 
principle of precautionary investment, the requirement of diversifying 
investments of the separate fund can only be dispensed with for direct 
pension obligations covered by a book reserve in the balance sheet.
In fulfi lling the standards of investments of assets, the possibility 
of the employer’s contingent liability should be considered. Imposition 
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of contingent liability on the employer allows a riskier investment of 
assets bundled together in a separate fund. Contingent liability is also 
relevant for a temporary defi cit, and this is specifi cally regulated in pen-
sion funds. The mandatory contingent liability of employers in CTAs 
releases the trustee both of his duties to diversify and of the limits on the 
amount he is permitted to invest in the employer’s company.
There is a further correlation between guarantees and investment 
behavior regarding life insurance policies. Allocation of surplus funds 
increases the guarantees. The currently prescribed solvency require-
ment, ensuring the ability to fulfi ll pension guarantees and the instant 
allocation of profi ts generated particularly from asset management, 
ought to be viewed with circumspection. In the international context, 
the common practice in the United Kingdom demonstrates that merely 
allocating profi ts from the surplus on maturity of the policy makes long-
term investment in shares possible. The British model is largely based 
on the famous British economist John Maynard Keynes, who encour-
aged long-term investment in shares as a safeguard against infl ation 
risks in his capacity as advisor of life insurance companies in the 1920s 
(Keynes 1927).
For life insurance policies, having a greater share of the fi nal al-
location of surplus funds in relation to the overall entitlement tends to 
increase profi ts. An appropriate innovation is that insurance contract 
law now facilitates the possibility of agreements in each individual con-
tract on how to deal with surplus funds on maturity. The disclosure 
requirements of furnishing appropriate information on the product’s 
performance and the guaranteed value of an individual pension contract 
are suffi cient in this regard. German insurance contract law now stipu-
lates the above disclosure duties. Furthermore, Germany should follow 
the British practice of obliging life insurance companies to point out the 
secondary market in cases where the benefi ciary considers terminating 
his or her life insurance contract.
The model of the loyally administered separate fund and the pen-
sion protection triangle are characterized by security and the possibility 
of contract modifi cation. Both in the insurance industry and in occu-
pational pensions, benefi ciaries are secured by setting up a separate 
fund and special security plans. Yet the Pensions Securities Association 
for occupational pensions ultimately guarantees only nominal interest, 
with the employee thus effectively bearing the infl ation risk. Where oc-
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cupational pension promises are covered externally, a guarantee, even 
of minimal interest, would be possible. For the purposes of funding 
the Pensions Securities Association, external coverage through CTAs 
should be considered.
A key protective mechanism for individual pensions is the benefi -
ciary’s right to terminate the contract. This is the only possible way for 
the benefi ciary to react to long-term poor results in asset management. 
In the event of the contractual terms being modifi ed, particularly where 
contractual parties are replaced, consideration must be given to the 
transfer of the pension contract’s entire value. The German Insurance 
Contract Act was recently changed to improve consumer protection in 
this respect. The portability principle in the law of occupational pen-
sions also applies to defi ned contribution pensions.
Employees are in special need of protection of annuity benefi ts in 
cases where the employer reorganizes. Following the employer’s reor-
ganization, the new legal entity must have suffi cient funds irrespective 
of other security mechanisms, so that pensions in the disbursement pe-
riod can be adequately adjusted. However, insurance-based funding or 
absolute security should not be required.
The Disbursement Period
The benefi ciary should be able to choose between annuity pay-
ments and lump-sum payments in the disbursement period. Except for 
tax-favored individual pension plans, annuities are not mandatory, with 
lump sum payments and withdrawal rights as possible alternatives. 
Such alternatives are desirable considering the high costs associated 
with annuities and the possible need of funds for nursing home care. 
These principles apply in German occupational pensions.
When a benefi ciary chooses annuity payments, consideration must 
be given to adjusting the payment in the disbursement period, failing 
which, the benefi ciary will bear all of the infl ation risk. In the disburse-
ment period, for many pension products German pension law requires, 
at least in principle, a guaranteed interest rate. Where the benefi ciary 
has an additional retirement plan, the allocation of the proceeds result-
ing from asset management meets the parties’ interests in principle. 
Thus the freedom of the benefi ciary to select an appropriate pension 
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product corresponding with his individual risk preferences would be 
advisable in this respect.
DEVELOPING GERMAN PRIVATE PENSION LAW
Implementing Defi ned Contribution Pensions in the German 
Occupational Pensions Act
The doctrinal foundation for defi ned contribution plans ought to be 
laid in the German law of occupational pensions. Defi ned contribution 
pensions can be developed from common legal principles applicable 
to private defi ned benefi t pensions. Except for the employer’s obliga-
tion to meet claims (guarantee) and protection against insolvency, the 
essential protective elements of the Occupational Pensions Act can be 
applied to defi ned contribution pensions. Restrictions on forfeiture, 
portability, and retention of profi ts in the disbursement period also ap-
ply to defi ned contribution pensions. The previous employer duties of 
guaranteeing claims and providing for nominal insolvency protection 
(without adjusting infl ation) could to a great extent functionally be re-
placed by a requirement to establish a separate fund, the principles of 
precautionary investment, encapsulation of the requirement of diver-
sifi cation, and stringent requirements regarding encroachments on the 
employee’s contractual position.
Against conventional German wisdom, a proposition that defi ned 
contribution plans are more risky than defi ned benefi t pensions or hybrid 
pensions does not hold true. When properly managed, defi ned contri-
bution pensions provide better protection against infl ation risk than 
defi ned benefi t pensions. Employees and employers both can benefi t 
from the use of tax-advantaged defi ned contribution pensions, which 
will shorten the period for vesting in occupational pensions, decrease 
the uncertainties surrounding the EU provisions stipulating equal treat-
ment and anti-discrimination, and improve both personal choice and 
mobility.
Against the background of an aging society and particularly in light 
of low-income workers’ reservations toward entering into private pen-
sion contracts, automatic enrollment in occupational pensions should 
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be provided, giving employees the possibility to opt out. The 65th Ger-
man Jurists Forum proposed automatic enrollment as early as 2004, 
and international studies on behavioral science have substantiated the 
positive effects of automatic enrollment in occupational pension plans 
(Steinmeyer 2004).11 For automatic enrollment provisions, defi ned con-
tribution schemes are best suited. Since employees lack a guaranteed 
income in defi ned contribution plans, employers should offer suffi cient 
investment choices, accommodating the fact that the employees bear 
the investment risk. The United States Pension Protection Act of 2006 
requires a choice between at least three investment products for defi ned 
contribution pensions. Other countries, such as Switzerland, require 
mandatory guarantees by external private pension institutions. Follow-
ing these examples, German law should also allow workers a choice of 
investments in defi ned contribution pension plans.
Information Provided to Benefi ciaries
The information required to be provided to benefi ciaries and retir-
ees should and can be based on general principles. The duties of private 
pension institutions to provide information are linked to participation 
in the private pension market. These duties follow from the fi duciary 
duties of the private pension institutions. Disclosure duties for life insur-
ance companies still also need to be developed in spite of the reform of 
insurance contract law. Disclosure of investment principles, allocation 
policies, and security of relevant guarantees are necessary in general, 
whether in a defi ned contribution pension or in life insurance contracts. 
In Germany, disclosure of investment principles is provided by explicit 
regulations for pension funds and investment companies. Such disclo-
sure duties for life insurance companies should be introduced, building 
on the British supervisory practice of the Financial Services Authority.
Disclosure of investment principles enables the participant in 
individual accounts and defi ned contribution pensions to assess the in-
vestment risks of different options. It allows the participant to make 
a decision corresponding with his or her individual risk preferences. 
Special importance should be attached to the full transparency of costs. 
Disclosure of costs and performance of fund products should be super-
vised by an independent offi ce and perhaps even by the government, 
similar to the British and Swedish models. For life insurance policies, 
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the British model of requiring companies to inform their clients about 
the secondary market should be followed.
Special disclosure duties exist at the conclusion of pension con-
tracts and before the disbursement period. Product information in 
individual pensions should always be given prior to the establishment 
of the pension contract. In occupational pensions, the fact that the pen-
sion is frequently attached to the initiation of the employment contract 
needs to be taken into account. Thus, providing information of the ex-
istence of a pension before contract fi nalization is suffi cient. Detailed 
information only needs to be given after the fi nalization of the employ-
ment contract. Where information is provided externally, for example, 
by pension funds, retirement funds, and direct life insurance compa-
nies, essential disclosure duties can be assigned solely to the external 
occupational pension institution.
Before the disbursement period commences, the benefi ciary should 
be informed about payment options, including plans of disbursement or 
annuity payments. Special emphasis should be placed on information 
regarding indexation of pension benefi ts. Choosing an indexed pension 
plan is advisable; failing this, the benefi ciary will bear the entire risk of 
infl ation. Participation in the outcome of asset management principally 
meets the interests of the parties, e.g., the employer, the benefi ciary, and 
the external pension provider. This is particularly the case if a minimum 
payment is guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
Germany’s occupational pension system should provide employees 
with investment choices and encourage higher participation rates. The 
latter goal should be realized through automatic enrollment in occu-
pational pension schemes, giving employees the possibility to opt out. 
Incentives for automatic enrollment should be set by the Occupation 
Pensions Act or by tax law, at least with regard to large employers. 
Cost-effective individual choices for employees should be promoted 
through including defi ned contribution pensions in the German Occu-
pational Pensions Act. Offering investment alternatives with different 
risk profi les would allow employees to fi nd solutions corresponding 
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with their individual risk preferences. In light of typical German saving 
behavior and the corresponding expectations of benefi ciaries, a tradi-
tional insurance product should be chosen as the default investment 
product.
Notes
Text is derived from my German habilitation thesis Private Altersvorsorge: Betriebs-
rentenrecht und individuelle Vorsorge (Private pensions: occupational and individual 
pensions), Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 
(Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law), Beiträge zum 
ausländischen und internationale Privatrecht (Contributions to Comparative and In-
ternational Private Law), Mohr Siebeck, 2009. I thank Martin Wilhelm, LL.M., for 
preparing the English translation.
1. See Steinmeyer (2004) for an account of the reduced performance of state-funded 
pension plans.
2. These are the fi gures currently reported in the yearly pension information provided 
by the German state pension system.
3. Poterba, Shoven, and Sialm (2004) report a nominal return for 12 investment 
funds for the period 1962–1998 of 12.7 percent at an infl ation rate of 4.7 percent. 
Munnell and Sundén (2004), referring to Ibbotson, put the real return for United 
States shares at 7.1 percent for the period 1926–2008; Hopp (2008) puts the equiv-
alent fi gure for German shares at 4.9 percent for the period 1960–2007.
4. According to Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2008), among the largest industrial-
ized nations for the period 1990–2007, German shares have been the most volatile, 
and German bonds have had the lowest real returns (−1.8 percent). In addition, 
losses on the German share market were the highest worldwide in the periods im-
mediately following World War I and the bursting of the Internet bubble.
5. For an earlier account of true defi ned contributions, see Arbeitsgemeinschaft für 
betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V. (1997).
6. Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Bilanzrechts (Bilanzrechts moderni sierungsgesetz 
– BilMoG) (Accounting Law Modernization Act), 25.5.2009, BGBl (Federal Ga-
zette) I 1102.
7. For an instructive review on the impact of private pensions on capital markets, see 
Kübler (1991); see Buxbaum (1991) for the basic conditions set by occupational 
pension law and tax law.
8. For the United Kingdom, see Myners (2001, p. 1), which states that “strong funded 
pension system[s] [are] . . . key national asset[s].”
9. For a discussion of the employer’s position as an intermediary, see Köndgen 
(2004).
10. Federal Labor Court, BAGE 112, 1, 7. The Federal Labor Court builds on the Ger-
man legal position up to the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933.
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11. For the United States, see Akerlof (2002), Lucas (2005), Madrian and Shea (2001), 
Orszag and Orszag (2005), Poterba (2005), Thaler and Bernartzi (2004), and 
Turner (2006). See also Munnell and Sundén (2005). For the United Kingdom, see 
Department for Work and Pensions (2008).
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